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House of Lords: Relevant or Relic? 
An Analysis of the Political Relevance of Legislature Upper Houses 
Robert Connor 
The House of Lords has been a 
legislative institution in Great Britain for 
over seven-hundred years. However, in 
modern politics the British people view the 
Lords as a relic of a bygone aristocratic age 
where those of “high birth” ruled over the 
common people. For the past few decades, 
there has been a heated debate in the United 
Kingdom over the future of the Lords. Past 
reforms have included removing hereditary 
peers, strictly limiting the Lords’ power, and 
changing the method of choosing members 
of the House. For this reason, it is fair to ask 
if the House of Lords is still politically 
relevant in British politics today. However, 
this question can, and should, extend to 
encompass all parliamentary upper houses. 
This is because of the trend for bicameral 
legislatures to concentrate power in the 
lower chamber, the people’s chamber, as 
opposed to the upper house, which is 
considered as the more prestigious but less 
powerful house. This paper sets out to 
accomplish three goals: the first is to 
compile an all-encompassing definition of 
political relevance, something that the 
political scientist community has not 
addressed before; second, to develop a 
method of determining political relevance; 
and third to examine whether or not 
parliamentary upper houses are still 
politically relevant using this method. To do 
so this paper will examine the weakest of the 
weak upper houses the British House of 
Lords. The purpose of this is to show that if 
even the House of Lords, the hallmark 
example of the weak upper house is still 
politically relevant, and then it can inferred 
that all the other upper houses in modern 
democracies are also politically relevant. 
Once complete this paper will show that 
although upper houses are not as powerful 
as lower houses, they are nonetheless 
relevant in the political system.  
There has been much debate on the 
relevance of upper houses of parliaments in 
the modern age. While some argue that 
upper houses are relics of a bygone age, 
others argue that in many upper houses, 
while being less powerful than lower 
houses; still have a role to play in today’s 
political environment. In this section, the 
current role of upper houses will be 
examined. An examination of one specific 
example, the British Houses of Lords, the 
hallmark of “weak” upper houses will then 
be done. 
In contemporary politics the upper 
house have become almost relics in many 
political systems. With the exception of the 
United States, in all bicameral parliaments 
the lower house holds the majority of the 
political power. (In the United States the 
upper house, the Senate, is superior to the 
lower house, the House of Representatives, 
in both precedent and in actual legislative 
power.) (Fish and Kroenig, 2009) For the 
purposes of this paper, the United States 
Senate will be ignored as the exception to 
the rule that upper houses are weaker than 
lower houses in bicameral legislatures. What 
has become an important issue for debate 
among the political science community is if 
the upper house is still a relevant body.  
Sir Ivor Jennings argues that upper 
houses are really only politically relevant in 
federal systems, such as the United States. 
Nevertheless, those in unitary systems they 
can become redundant and unnecessary. 
(Jennings 1958) De Minon agrees with this 
point, but goes further to argue that even in 
federal systems the usefulness of bicameral 
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legislatures is quickly disappearing. This is 
due to the current trend of federalist states to 
become more centralized. Moreover, 
because of this centralization the upper 
houses are not as necessary.  De Minon 
points to Germany as a prime example of a 
federal state with a centralized government 
and weak upper house.  De Minon argues 
that this uselessness of upper houses leaves 
them irrelevant (De Minon, 1975)  
Money and Tsebelis address this 
issue of bicameralism in federal and unitary 
systems. They argue that the primary 
difference is that in federal system, there is a 
balance of power between the two houses, 
but in unitary systems, an upper house can 
become redundant because it does not have 
a clear constituency. In addition, in unitary 
systems the primary role of the upper house 
is to provide a “learned” body who can act 
as the protectors of that state’s constitution.  
(Money and Tsebelis 1992) In other terms, 
Money and Tsebelis argue that the upper 
houses in both systems are not “useless”, to 
use de Minon’s word, but that they are, on 
the surface at least, provided 
responsibilities. (Money and Tsebelis 1992) 
Druckman, Martin, and Thies also 
disagree with de Minon. They argue that 
even if the upper house is useless and weak 
that does not automatically transition into 
irrelevance. They argue that even the 
weakest upper houses still have some 
influence in their political systems. This is 
because one power that is consistent 
throughout upper houses is the power either 
to veto legislation, or delay legislation. 
Though many countries have put restrictions 
on when their upper houses can do this, it 
nevertheless gives them political capital. 
Whether this influence translates into 
outright power is debatable but not, 
according to the authors, the influence itself. 
(Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005) 
It is time to turn attention to the 
House of Lords in particular. Most view the 
House of Lords is the main example of a 
“weak” upper house. In fact, many disregard 
the house completely and argue that it has 
no relevance in modern Britain. This was the 
case as early 1929. In that year, Eugene 
Parker Chase argued that the people would 
never consider the Lords legitimate while its 
members are selected “by providence and 
not merit”. (Chase 1929, 572) This was 
especially true before the passage of the Life 
Peerage Act of 1958. The Life Peerage Act 
addressed one of the most controversial 
elements of the House of Lords. Its members 
inherited their seats by creating a system 
where peers are appointed only for their life 
and their children could not inherit their 
title. The new law only allows these "Life 
Peers" to sit in the House of Lords. The 
Prime Minister appoints these peers, while 
the monarch confirms the selection. More 
recently, Russell and Cornes argue that 
because the House of Lords have no 
component that is elected, either directly or 
indirectly, then the House is illegitimate. In 
order to create legitimacy, they argue, the 
people of Britain must have some voice in 
who is allowed to sit in the House. (Russell 
and Cornes 2001, 89) Peter Dorey goes 
further to argue that unless the entirety of 
the House of Lords is democratically elected 
then the House is illegitimate. (Dorey 2006, 
15) 
Others argue that the Lords are 
irrelevant because they have very little 
authority. What no one will argue is that the 
House of Lords has no independent 
authority of the House of Commons. Prior to 
2009, the House of Lords functioned as the 
highest court in the Britain, but that power 
was revoked when the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom was formed. The powers it 
does have are meant to check the power of 
the House of Commons: the ability to delay 
any legislation (except for money bills) for a 
maximum of one year; the power to 
introduce legislation; the ability to adopt 
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amendments to legislation sent up from the 
House of Commons; and the power to adopt 
or defeat legislation from the Commons. 
The Lords possess these de jure powers, 
meaning that these are the Lords’ powers 
according to the written law. What is in 
doubt is how these de jure powers translate 
into de facto powers, meaning the powers 
the Lords have in practice, (In practical 
terms these powers are often different) or if 
they transition at all. Chase argues that even 
though the Lords may have these powers on 
paper, the Commons can easily overturn the 
will of the Lords. (Chase 1929, 573) 
Patterson and Mughan point out that, 
compared to other European bicameral 
parliaments, it is much easier in the British 
system for the lower house to overrule the 
upper. (Patterson and Mughan 2001) This 
highlights the uneven balance of powers 
within the British parliament. 
 Another strong argument made in 
defense of the Lords is that since the 
Commons appoints the Lords, the Commons 
control the decisions of the Lords. Dorey 
makes this assertion saying that it is 
impossible to forget that the Prime Minister 
and his government from the Commons now 
appoint the Lords, and that because the 
Commons control membership to the Lords 
they are not to be considered autonomous. 
(Dorey 2006, 20) Nevertheless, this 
argument is rather unconvincing; first, he 
fails to realize that once the Commons have 
appointed a Lord, that Lord is there for life; 
this means that once the Lords are appointed 
they can do what they like, within the 
confines of the Lords’ Constitutional 
responsibilities, without having to worry 
about retaliation from the Commons. In this 
sense, the Lords are comparable to Justices 
on the United States Supreme Court. Once 
appointed it is difficult to influence voting 
behavior. 
 The previous arguments are the main 
arguments that deal with the Lords being 
politically irrelevant, but there are scholars 
who argue that the Lords do retain some 
relevancy. In terms of the makeup of the 
Lords, Alexandra Kelso agrees with Russell 
and Cornes Kelso that there must be a 
democratic element to the selection of 
Lords, but argues that the Life Peerage Act 
does create an indirect election for the 
Lords, since they are de facto chosen by the 
democratically elected Prime Minister. This, 
Kelso argues, does give the Lords 
legitimacy. The major oversight Kelso, 
Russel, and Scaria make is that none of them 
address if the British people themselves 
view the House as legitimate.(Kelso 2006, 
14) This is a crucial point because, not only 
does an institution need legitimacy legally, 
but it needs to appear to be legitimate as 
well. 
Russell and Sciara address the issue 
of how powerful the Lords are as a 
legislative body. They argue that the Lords 
have gained more power by using defeats, or 
striking down legislation sent up to them by 
the Commons. The authors examined all of 
the cases in which the Lords defeated a bill 
in chamber and the reactions of the 
Commons. In all of these cases, the 
Commons worked with the Lords to reach 
an agreement to get the legislation passed 
rather than overruling them. They divided 
these compromises into three categories: a 
win for the Commons, meaning they got 
most of what they wanted at the expense of 
the Lords; a draw, both Houses got 
something they wanted; and a win for the 
Lords. The results showed that between 
1996 and 2006 when the Lords won 40.1% 
of the time. (Russell and Scalia 2008, 5) 
What this mean in terms of the authority of 
the House of Lords is that even though they 
may not have the power to translate their 
positions on issues into policy, they do have 
some power in the legislative process, if 
they did not this number would be much 
lower.  
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Russell and Sciara also examine how 
much power the Commons have over the 
Lords. They argue that the Lords are by no 
means a puppet of the Commons. They 
argue that this can clearly be seen in its 
regular use of defeats and delays. (Russell 
and Sciara 2008, 3) Kelso agrees with this 
point, but further argues that the tension 
between the Labour Party and the Lords 
during the 1990s is another indication of the 
Lords’ autonomy. If the Commons 
controlled the Lords, this tension would not 
exist. (Kelso 2006, 10) Even to Chase 
writing in the 1920s before the Peerage Act 
of 1958, the fact that the freely elected 
Commons did not have complete control 
over the, then, hereditary Lords was his 
greatest criticism of the House. (Chase 1929, 
577) This is not to argue that these authors 
believe the Lords to be completely 
autonomous, but to argue that they are not 
merely a rubberstamp for the Commons. 
The Lords have control over their decisions 
and that these decisions are not dictated by 
the Commons. However, not everyone 
agrees that the Lords have at least some 
autonomy from the Commons. 
Although academics in the past have 
attempted to answer several question 
regarding the legitimacy, authority, 
autonomy, and level of influence in the 
House of Lords, each has addressed these 
factors individually and not as a whole. 
None has taken the next step and examines 
these four factors together and their 
relationships to one another in order to 
understand fully the true political relevance 
of the Lords. Are they still relevant in the 
United Kingdom of today, or are they a relic 
of a bygone age. The exact question this 
paper addresses. 
The most important question to ask 
of any institution is “is it politically 
relevant?” Webster dictionary defines 
relevant as having significant and 
demonstrable bearing on the matter at hand; 
meaning does a body have influence, in this 
case influence on policy and legislation. 
However, it is necessary for an institution, 
specifically a legislative institution, to have 
more than influence in order to be relevant. 
In order to be considered politically relevant 
a legislative institution must possess, or 
must appear to possess legitimacy, authority, 
and autonomy in addition to influence on 
legislation is this order of importance.  
Perhaps the most important factor of 
political relevance is legitimacy, or by what, 
if any, right the institution has claim to 
power. Legitimacy can come in many forms; 
the most common form today is in the form 
of democratic legitimacy: the right to rule 
based on democratic elections. However, 
this right can be in other forms: legal 
legitimacy codified in laws and statues; 
control of the military can lead to dictatorial 
legitimacy; even divine right, or the idea of 
“God’s chosen ruler” is a form of political 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is vital for a political 
institution because if a populace does not 
view that body as being legitimate it has no 
incentive to follow those institutions orders. 
This is why I include dictatorial legitimacy, 
or right by might, because even though they 
may not be traditionally legitimate a 
dictator’s control over the military gives him 
a strong claim on power. (Hetherington, 
1998) 
The second most important factor of 
political relevance is authority. Now, many 
would intuitively think this would be the 
most important factor in political relevance, 
but remember that if a body is not viewed as 
legitimate it does not have a claim on power. 
This why Legitimacy must be established 
first. What authority means is what the 
institution can actually do; another term for 
this might be de facto powers. (Reed, 2001) 
Does the body have the authority to levy 
taxes, to declare war, to regulate trade, to 
print money, to approve treaties, to submit a 
budget, even to declare a national holiday 
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are all important questions because they 
demonstrate how much power that 
institution has. I am making a distinction 
here between de jure and de facto powers, 
because this is more helpful to this 
discussion. This is due to the realization that 
all legislative bodies will attempt to 
maximize their authority to the fullest extent 
allowable under the law. Even an 
institutions ability to create this 
maximization is a reflection of their 
authority. 
The third factor for relevance is 
autonomy, whether or not the legislative 
body is governing, or is being governed. As 
with authority, autonomy builds upon the 
previous factors, and that the previous 
factors, legitimacy and authority, are 
necessary in order for a legislative body to 
be autonomous. The point is to examine 
whether the institution has control over itself 
and its decisions, or is merely a rubber 
stamp. Nevertheless, an institution can be 
legitimate and have some authority while 
not being autonomous. If that institution is a 
puppet, or if its decisions are dictated to it 
by another branch of government, or even 
another house of the same legislature, then 
that body is not truly autonomous. The 
parliament is usually dominated by the 
lower house with the upper having few if 
any means to assert what authority is has; 
this is an issue that many upper houses in 
parliamentary systems face. An example of 
this is would the institution be more 
analogous to the United States Congress, 
which is independent of the other two 
branches of government, the Executive and 
Judiciary, or to the Senate of the ancient 
Roman Empire which was controlled by the 
Executive branch. 
The last factor is influence. This is 
the concept of whether or not an institution 
can change legislation in other parts of 
government to receive its preferred policies. 
This factor addresses those institutions 
mentioned above, which may not be 
completely autonomous but are still relevant 
to that political system. This is because 
those bodies still have some influence over 
the institutions that hold dominance over 
them, such as blocks on legislation, limited 
veto power, etc. This is the definitive 
difference between a body that is merely 
subservient, meaning they may not be 
autonomous but still have influence and 
body that is a only a rubberstamp, a body 
with neither autonomy nor influence. For 
example, in many European systems, the 
lower house of parliament carries 
dominance over the upper house, but in most 
instances, the upper house retains some 
influence over legislation. 
So far, it has been established that in 
order for a legislative institution to be 
considered politically relevant it must have 
legitimacy and at least some independent 
authority, and either be autonomous or have 
influence on policy, or both. Therefore, it is 
necessary to determine if the House of Lords 
meet these qualifications. However, the 
more difficult task is how to quantify these 
separate factors and determine if the House 
of Lords possess them. 
In order to determine if the House of 
Lords are legitimate it is necessary to first 
examine how that body was created. Was it 
codified in legislation, was it created by an 
individual, and was it established through 
the tenants of some religion? This will 
determine which type of legitimacy the 
Lords are basing themself off. However, this 
is not enough. In order to determine 
legitimacy it must be determined whether 
the population believes that the House is 
legitimate. Perception is the key here, 
because if the House is not viewed as 
legitimate then it is not legitimate, no matter 
how it was created or by what means it 
claims the power to legislate. In order to do 
this polling data will be collected in regards 
to how the people of Great Britain view the 
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House of Lords. The way in which it will 
establish that the House of Lords has 
independent authority is by examining what 
the House can and cannot do. These powers 
will then are examined and determine if 
these powers give the Lords any real 
authority. Autonomy will be determined by 
examining what checks the Commons have 
on the Lords, and how the Lords are chosen. 
These factors will show if the Lords are 
autonomous or if the Commons is 
controlling them. Lastly, the House’s level 
of influence will be investigated by 
examining how effective the Lords are at 
getting their positions passed in legislation. 
To do this the rate at which the Commons 
approves bills introduced in the Lords will 
be viewed. This rate will show how 
influential the Lords views are in the House 
of Commons. By the use of these 
measurements, one can develop a valid 
means to quantify the political relevance of 
the House of Lords. 
Since this study will rely heavily on 
qualitative data, with some quantitative data, 
the reliability of the sources used will be 
paramount. All qualitative sources will have 
been peer reviewed and all quantitative 
sources, including polls, will come from 
only the most trusted British organizations.  
 The reason one can examine the 
House of Lords in order to assess the 
relevance of upper houses in bicameral 
legislatures is methodological in nature. As 
stated before the House of Lords is the 
hallmark example of the weak upper house, 
it is perceived as outdated, irrelevant, and 
unnecessary, which is common with most 
other upper houses. Nonetheless, because of 
the nature of its composition the reputation 
of the House of Lords suffers from these 
blemishes to a much greater degree than its 
elected counterparts. For this reason, the 
House of Lords can be incredibly useful in 
assessing the relevancy of all upper houses. 
Because, if it can show that even the House 
of Lords, the weakest of all upper houses, 
has some political relevance it will show 
that the other upper houses should still be 
politically relevant. 
As stated above in order to establish 
legitimacy two factors will be looked at: 
what give the House legitimacy, and 
whether the public perceive the body to be 
legitimate. The foundations of the House of 
Lords lie in the Magna Carta of 1215, which 
created a council of twenty noblemen who 
had the authority to overrule the reigning 
monarch if his decrees violated their rights. 
From the period of the thirteenth century to 
the mid-nineteenth century, the House of 
Lords reigned as the premier House in the 
Parliament. It was only after the English 
Civil War and the subsequent Glorious 
Revolution that the Commons began to gain 
more power in the Parliament. (Miller 1962) 
However, the Commons would not become 
the dominant chamber until the reforms of 
the mid nineteenth century. In addition, 
though there is no British Constitution, the 
body of laws and statutes that have been 
taken to form the unwritten constitution 
clearly provides for the House of Lords. 
(Round 1915) What this is taken to mean is 
that the House of Lords can clearly claim to 
be legitimate based on the principle of legal 
legitimacy, the definition of which plainly 
mean legitimacy based on laws and statutes.  
 However, this only answers half the 
question of whether the House of Lords is 
legitimate or not. The more important 
question is whether the House of Lords is 
perceived as legitimate by the British 
people. While it is clear that the House is 
legally legitimate, this question is more 
difficult to answer. To answer this recent 
polling data and how it relates to the Lords 
will be examined. The following tables all 
represent polls taken by Ipsos MORI, the 
world’s largest research company, showing 
public opinion in the United Kingdom 
regarding the House of Lords. 
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*See table 1 
 
 The data in table 1 shows that 
between the years of 1999 and 2006 there 
was a marked increase in how the public 
viewed the legitimacy of the House of 
Lords. Among all of the British voters, 
forty-three percent believe that the Lords are 
now more legitimate than they were in the 
1990s. It worth noting that conservative 
voters did not have an increase at the same 
level as the liberal voters. One explanation 
for this discrepancy is that during the time 
this poll was taken the liberals had a 
majority in the Lords. This rise in perception 
of legitimacy can be due to many factors, 
but is most likely due to the House of Lords 
Reform bill of 2005, which created an 
independent Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, a power that was previously held 
by the Lords. It may seem counterintuitive 
to think that a loss of power would result in 
a heightened sense of legitimacy, but this 
specific power given to the Lords was 
extremely unpopular the people of Britain 
who preferred an independent judiciary. So 
even though this law may have taken away 
power from the Lords, that power was 
replaced by popularity. This poll provides 
the best evidence that the Britons view the 
Lords as legitimate, but in order to be more 
thorough two other pools will be considered. 
 
*See table 2  
 
Although this exact question does 
not address legitimacy as directly as the 
previous table, one can make several 
inferences regarding how the people of 
Great Britain view the House of Lords. First, 
about one-sixth of the population believes 
that the House of Lords is in no need of 
reform, that the House is legitimate and 
functioning adequately. While a clear 
minority, it is more common than those that 
believe the House is a clear danger to British 
politics and must be reformed immediately, 
a mere seven percent. What is clear is that 
the overwhelming majority, 72%, believe 
that the House of Lords is in need of reform, 
but think that other issues are more 
important at the moment. This implies that 
the majority of the population does not see 
the Lords as a direct threat to their liberty. If 
the majority of people believed the House to 
be illegitimate, the number of people who 
believe that reform of the Lords is a top 
priority would be much higher. 
 
*See table 3 
 
 In table 3 it can be seen that the 
British people as a whole, believe that when 
it comes to how well each House carries out 
its role, the House of Lords does a better job 
than the House of Commons. This again 
reinforces the fact that the British people see 
the Lords as legitimate. Although the poll 
does not use the word legitimate, the fact 
that the majority of people believe that the 
Lords are fulfilling their duties, and that they 
are in fact doing a better job than the 
Commons, show that they appear legitimate. 
 As mentioned before, legitimacy is 
the most important factor when it comes to 
political relevance. It has been shown that 
the existence of the House of Lords is 
strongly rooted in British law, and, with 
these three tables, the people of Britain 
understand the House to be legitimate. With 
this accomplished it is now prudent to turn 
our attention to the authority of the House of 
Lords. 
In order to determine if the Lords 
have any de facto authority this paper will 
determine what legislative powers the body 
possesses. According to the website of the 
United Kingdom Parliament, the House of 
Lords have only three real powers: the 
power to introduce legislation, the power to 
delay legislation for up to one year, and the 
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power to amend or defeat legislation 
originating in the 
Commons.(www.parliament .uk, 2012) 
Nonetheless do these de jure powers 
translate into de facto power? First, it is 
necessary to examine the power to introduce 
legislation. The Lords can independently 
draft legislation and introduce it into the 
Parliament. In fact, In 2012, of the one 
hundred and twenty bills put before the 
parliament, thirty-six originated in the 
House of Lords, which calculates to about 
thirty percent of the bills. 
(www.parliament.uk, 2012) It is worth 
mentioning however, that the Lords most 
commonly introduce bills related to minor 
domestic matters. The Lords almost never 
introduce bills associated with social, 
political, or foreign issues; these matters are 
left to the Commons. Therefore, even 
though the Lords do have the power to 
introduce legislation on any topic, in 
practice they limit themselves to a relatively 
small sphere of influence. 
 The next primary power of the Lords 
is the power to delay legislation. The Lords 
are authorized to delay legislation sent up 
from the Commons for up to one year, but 
this ability is not as powerful as it may 
seem. First of all the Lords cannot delay so 
called money bills, bills designed to raise 
money through taxes or spend public 
money. (www.parliament.uk , 2012) The 
definition is loose and can encompass many 
different types of legislation. The only 
individual who decides what is a money bill 
is the Speaker of the House of Commons, 
and this decision is final, once a Speaker has 
designated a bill, as a money bill there is no 
means to appeal this decision. In addition, 
since the Speaker has a habit of labeling any 
major piece of legislation money bill the 
Lords are de facto locked out of the major 
legislation, and cannot employ their primary 
means of checking the Commons. This 
relegates the use of delays to mainly minor, 
domestic policies, but as has already seen it 
is in these areas that the Lords are at their 
most powerful anyway. 
The last main power of the Lords is 
the power to amend or defeat legislation 
passed up from the Commons.  The Lords 
frequently take advantage of these powers. 
(Russell and Cornes 2001) Rather than 
introducing their own bills to address topics 
outside of their ordinary sphere of influence, 
mainly minor domestic issues, they amend 
bills from the Commons to reflect their 
policies. However, if the Commons do not 
accept the Lords’ amendments, the Lords do 
have the ability to defeat the bill by not 
passing the bill. This does not stop the bill 
from being passed, as the Commons can 
overrule the Lords; but it does complicate 
matters for the Commons. In recent years, 
the Lords have been using this power of 
defeats to greater and greater effect. Table 4 
shows how in 2003 the Lords used defeats to 
get their policies through the Commons. 
 
*See table 4 
 
What is meant by a win for the Lords 
is that the policies of the Lords are 
expressed to a greater degree than those of 
the Commons. The fact that the results 
showing the Lords wining over forty percent 
of the time is surprising, especially given the 
weak perception of the Lords, one would 
expect this number to be much lower. The 
reason for this result is that the process for 
overruling the Lords is usually slower and 
more arduous than compromising with them 
(this is to be discussed further in the section 
on autonomy). It is clear that the Lords’ use 
of amendments and defeats have given them 
some degree of political power, even though 
they de facto have a limitation on their 
power to introduce legislation and their 
delaying power is so strictly controlled. 
While clearly not the major power holder, 
they nonetheless are not powerless 
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bystanders in the politics of the United 
Kingdom.  
Shifting focus now, whether or not 
the Lords are autonomous from the 
Commons, or whether they are puppets of 
the lower house must be addressed. This will 
do by examining the checks placed on the 
Commons by the Lords. Then how the Lords 
are selected, all in an effort to determine if 
the Lords can claim autonomy, will be 
investigated. Note that discussing the checks 
the Lords have on the Commons will not be 
discussed here; these checks were discussed 
in the section on authority of the Lords. 
 The system of checks placed on the 
Lords by the Commons is specifically 
designed so that the democratically elected 
house can overrule the appointed upper 
house. If a bill is defeated by the Lords, the 
Commons reserve the right to reintroduce 
that bill in the following session of 
Parliament. When the bill is reintroduced, 
the Commons do not need the Lords to 
approve the bill before it can be passed into 
law. What this essentially does is to allow 
the Commons to bypass the Lords on the 
second go around, if the first failed. 
Nonetheless, the Commons must wait up to 
a year in some instances in order to take 
advantage of this mechanism. This also 
explains why the Commons are willing to 
negotiate and compromise with the Lords as 
often as they do. (See section on authority) 
The impact this has on the level of 
autonomy the Lords possess is that the 
checks placed on the Lords are no stricter 
than those placed on the Commons. 
Additionally, although there is a mechanism 
for the Commons to bypass the Lords this 
mechanism is slow and more often than not, 
the Commons chose to negotiate rather than 
take advantage of it. This indicates that the 
Lords are not puppets controlled by the 
Lords, but are an autonomous house. 
However, in order to say confidently that the 
Lords are independent of the Commons, one 
must examine the system in which the Lords 
are chosen. 
Many different groups can put 
forward candidates to sit in the House of 
Lords. Some of these groups include the 
Prime Minister, the House of Lords 
Nominating Committee and individuals 
political parties. Also, although frowned 
upon, candidates can even nominate 
themselves. Candidates are then reviewed by 
the House of Lords Appointments 
Commission. Established in 2000, the House 
of Lords Appointments Commission is a 
nonpartisan group that vets candidates for 
the Lords and either accepts or denies the 
request. Then the list of approved candidates 
are handed over to the Crown for Royal 
Assent, which the Crown provides in a 
rather rubberstamp like manner. Before the 
Commission was created in 2000, the Lords 
were nominated only by the Prime Minister. 
This gave the Commons direct control over 
the composition of the Lords. Now the 
process is more neutral. One more factor 
that is important to note once a Lord is 
nominated, approved, and created, unless 
that Lord behaves improperly or commits a 
crime, he is a Lord for life. This means that 
even if a Lord is not voting in the way the 
group that nominated them wanted to, there 
is nothing that group can do. Therefore, if a 
conservative Prime Minister nominated a 
Lord to vote conservatively in the House, 
and that Lord starts to vote with the liberals, 
there is no mechanism for the Prime 
Minister to remove that Lord. How this 
relates to autonomy is that even though the 
Commons may have some influence on 
selecting the Lords, they have no way to 
control them afterward. This coupled with 
the lack of highly restrictive checks for the 
Lords by the Commons illustrate that the 
Lords are not puppets of the lower house but 
are independent and free to express their 
own policies in their legislation, even when 
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that policy contradicts those of the 
Commons. 
 The last factor concerns political 
relevance, influence on legislation. Influence 
will be measured by the rate at which 
legislation introduced by the Lords become 
law. In the British system bills are 
introduced in one House of Parliament, 
approved, sent to the other House for 
approval and then sent to the Crown, 
monarch, for approval. This approval is 
known as Royal Assent and is the last stage 
of a bill before it becomes law. The chart 
below shows how often bills from the Lords 
have become law since 2007. 
 
*See table 5 
 
As can be seen from table 5 no bill 
originating from the Lords has been passed 
into law since 2008. Now, while this may 
appear to indicate that the Lords have little 
influence on policy, it must be remembered 
that overall the Lords do not introduce many 
bills to begin with, as already discussed, 
they tend to amend bills from the Commons 
to reflect their policies rather introduce their 
own legislation. However, aside from that, 
the fact that very few bills introduced by the 
Lords eventually become law does indicate 
that while they may have some influence 
using delays and defeats (see section on 
authority for more details) they have 
nowhere near the amount of influence the 
Commons possess. 
 What this research has shown is that 
the House of Lords meets the requirements 
put forward and should be considered 
politically relevant. It is legitimate, and is 
seen as legitimate by the public. The Lords 
have some level of authority. The upper 
house is autonomous of the lower house. 
Additionally, although they have some 
influence on legislation from the Commons 
it is not sufficient to say with certainty that 
the House can influence bills put forward by 
the lower house. Nonetheless, what does all 
of this mean? Our definition of political 
relevance was that an institution must be 
legitimate, possess independent authority, 
and either is autonomous in the policies it 
expresses, or has some influence on policies 
put forth by the dominant house in order to 
be considered politically relevant. When 
looked at by this definition it has been 
shown that the House of Lords are 
politically relevant because it meets all the 
requirements of the definition. It is 
legitimate, has some power, and is 
autonomous. In addition because the House 
of Lords is considered by many to be the 
weakest and least politically relevant of all 
upper houses, one can further hypothesize 
that parliamentary upper houses in general 
are politically relevant. Again, this is not to 
say that they are as relevant, or more 
relevant, than lower houses, which are by far 
more powerful and influential. What is 
meant is that they are not as weak and 
powerless as their reputations would lead 
one to believe, they are not relics of an older 
idea of governance but are still relevant in 
the modern political system. 
 
  
21 
 
10
The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research, Vol. 14 [2013], Art. 5
http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/vol14/iss1/5
Table 1: 
Question: Public attitudes to change in Lords legitimacy since 1999 
Voters Far More 
Legitimate 
More 
Legitimate 
No 
Change 
Less 
Legitimate 
Far Less 
Legitimate 
Total 
more 
Legitimate 
Labour 19% 32% 36% 10% 4% 51% 
Conservative 9% 19% 26% 20% 26% 28% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
19% 30% 28% 11% 11% 49% 
All voters 16% 27% 31% 13% 13% 43% 
Source: Data taken from Russel and Scaria, 2006. Data was collected by Ipsos MORI poll for 
Constitution Unit, May 2005. 1,007 valid respondents, with results adjusted to be representative 
of the population as a whole. 
 
 
Table 2: 
Question: As you may have heard, there has recently been debate about reforming the House of 
Lords. Which of these statements is closest to your view? 
I support reforming the House of Lords, and the 
government should make it an immediate priority 
7% 
I support reforming the House of Lords, but there 
are more important things that the government 
should be concentrating on at the moment 
72% 
I don’t support reforming the House of Lords 16% 
Don’t know 4% 
Source: Taken from Ipsos MORI interviewed a representative sample of 1,006 adults aged 18+ 
across Great Britain. Interviews were conducted by telephone 14-16 July 2012.  Data are 
weighted to match the profile of the population. 
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Table 3: 
Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree that …? 
 
Source: Taken from Ipsos MORI.com. Results are based on 1,490 adults aged 18+ in the UK. 
Interviewed face-to-face in home from 23-28 November 2006. 
 
Table 4: 
Question Outcome by Significance of Government Defeats in 2003 
Policy significance Gov’t win Lords win Total % Lords win 
Minor policy 27 12 39 30.8% 
Medium-significance 
Policy 
60 45 105 42.9% 
Significant policy 77 53 130 40.8% 
Total 164 110 274 40.1% 
Source: Data taken from Russell and Sciara 2008. Based out of 274 cases from the 2003 session 
of Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strongly agree 
Tend to 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't 
know 
 % % % % % % 
the House of 
Commons generally 
carries out its policy 
role well 
7 39 22 15 4 12 
the House of Lords 
generally carries out 
its policy role well 
8 41 24 9 3 15 
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Table 5: 
Question: How many bills originating in the House of Lords becomes Law? 
Session of 
Parliament 
Total number of 
Bills 
Number of HL 
Bills 
Number of Bills 
Given Royal 
Assent 
Number of HL 
Bills Given 
Royal Assent 
2007-2008 161 23 42 6 
2008-2009 164 20 35 0 
2009-2010 113 25 36 0 
2010-2012 390 36 54 0 
Source: Data taken from parliament.uk and compiled from among 828 bills since 2007. Note that 
HL designates bills originating in the House of Lords. 
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